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Getting Short-Changed?: The Impact of Outside Money on District Representation

Dr. Anne E. Baker
Santa Clara University

Abstract
Objective. As incumbent House members increasingly recruit campaign contributions from
individuals who reside outside of their districts, this raises the question of whether a dependency
on outside money affects members’ responsiveness and ideological proximity to district
constituents. Method. Using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies of 2006,
2008, and 2010 as well as individual contribution data corresponding to those years from the
U.S. Federal Election Commission, I examine this relationship using responsiveness and
proximity models of representation. Results. I find a dependency on outside contributions
decreases members’ responsiveness to their districts and increases the members’ ideological
extremity. Moreover, within-district contributions only minimally improve ideological alignment
between the member and the district. Conclusion. Donors receive additional representation from
members of the House at the expense of constituents.

*Direct all correspondence to Dr. Anne E. Baker, Santa Clara University, 500 El Camino Real,
Santa Clara, CA 95053, aebaker@scu.edu.
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As the cost of American elections continues to rise, members of Congress increasingly
recruit campaign contributions from individuals beyond the boundaries of their districts and
states. Previous research suggests that the “donor class” reside in only a handful of congressional
districts (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee, 2011; Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and
Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008) and that their policy preferences and ideological leanings are distinct
from the average Democratic or Republican voters who make up House members’ electoral
bases of support (Bramlett et al., 2011; Brown, Powell, and Wilcox, 1995; Francia, Green,
Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox, 2003; Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox, 2005).
These findings raise the question of whether a member’s increasing dependency on funds from
outside the district could lead to distortions in the representation provided to the district. Put
another way, the less the member’s financial constituency geographically overlaps with the
member’s electoral constituency, the greater the possibility that the member might be more
responsive to preferences that do not dovetail with those of constituents.
Few studies directly test whether campaign contributions from individuals can lead to
distortions in representation (for an exception see Fellowes and Wolf, 2004). Since individual
contributions serve as the largest source of campaign funds for candidates contesting in federal
elections (Francia et. al., 2005), this lacuna in the literature constitutes a considerable blind spot
in our understanding of representative relationships. What we do have are studies that examine
distortions in representation on the basis of varied responsiveness to different income groups (see
Bartels, 2006, 2008) and studies documenting the demographics, motivations, and potential
biases of donors (see Brown Powell, and Wilcox, 1993, 1995; Francia et. al., 2003, 2005;
Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008; Page, Bartels,
and Seawright, 2013). Together this work suggests the distinct possibility that individual
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contributors outside of the congressional district could impact the quality of representation
district constituents receive.
Using data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study from 2006, 2008, and
2010 as well as individual contribution data from the U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC), I
examine House members’ responsiveness to constituent preferences in relation to the amount of
individual contributions they receive from outside of their respective districts while controlling
for factors such as electoral vulnerability and member seniority. I find, regardless of their party
affiliation, members’ dependency on outside contributions draws them in a more extremely
liberal or extremely conservative ideological direction that is counter to the ideological
preferences of the district they represent. In short, outside contributions interfere with the
members’ responsiveness to constituents. Relatedly, I find members’ reliance upon contributions
from donors who reside within their districts only minimally reduces the ideological distance
between the member and the district thereby suggesting that within-district donors share the
ideological preferences of out-of-district donors. These tests demonstrate that both sets of donors
gain additional representation from members of the House at the expense of constituents.

Distortions in Representation and Donor Biases
The literature on money in politics supplies a number of major findings that lend
theoretical support to the hypothesis of interest here—namely, that individual campaign
contributions from outside of the member’s district might negatively impact the quality of
representation the member provides to his or her constituents. Donors outside of the district are
thought to seek “surrogate representation” as a means of promoting their distinct ideological,
policy, or personal identity-related preferences by gaining additional representation from many
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members of Congress rather than simply relying upon representation provided by their district’s
member (Gimpel et. al., 2008; Mansbridge, 2003). The prevalence of surrogate representation is
partly a function of the fact that overtime “territorial representation” no longer reflects as many
of a voter’s “significant interests” (Mansbridge, 2003: 522-523). The democratic benefit of this
form of representation is that it provides a way for individuals to gain some representation of
their interests in the event the individual’s preferred party does not win the election. The primary
drawback of this form of representation is that it “embodies far more political inequality”
because it devolves into a system where the “best financed ideas and interests gain
representation” (Mansbridge, 2003: 524).
A growing number of studies indicate members of Congress are more responsive to the
preferences of their wealthiest constituents than to the preferences of their middle class or
poorest constituents (see Bartels, 2006, 2008; Gilens, 2005, 2009). Flavin (2010) finds the
opinions of low-income voters do not influence responsiveness even on issues that
disproportionately affect the quality of their lives, such as TANF reforms, abortion, gun control,
and the death penalty. Whether the responsiveness or lack thereof that was uncovered in the
aforementioned studies is the direct consequence of the ability of particular constituents to
contribute to members’ re-election campaigns remains to be tested.
What we do know is that if such responsiveness to the rich occurs in order for members
of Congress to cultivate relationships with donors, it might prove problematic to the
representative relationship between the member and constituents because the wealthy
individuals, who primarily comprise the donor class, are demographically and ideologically
dissimilar from average voters and hold distinct policy preferences. The donor class tends to be
predominately old, white, and male (Brown et. al., 1993, 1995; Francia et al., 2003; Francia et.
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al., 2005). Moreover, they tend to be more ideologically extreme than the average voter (Francia
et. al., 2003; Francia et. al. 2005). Relatedly, in their survey of donors with questions replicating
questions featured in surveys of the electorate, Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013) find donors’
policy preferences differ from those of average voters. For instance, they support expanding
fewer social welfare programs than the general public. Page, Bartels, and Seawright (2013) also
find demographic differences among donors made little difference in their preferences for social
welfare provision or government regulation; rather, donors shared similar preferences by policy
area. Geography may play a further role in compounding preference homogeneity. Several
studies find that the majority of congressional campaign donors reside in just handful of
congressional districts (Cho and Gimpel, 2007; Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee,
and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008), where campaigns and parties recruit funds through existing
social networks (Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz,
2008).
In addition to preferences that are driven by their individual demographics—specifically
gender, race, and income—donors may also have geographic-based interests that are connected
to their materialistic, purposive, and social goals for contributing that differ from those of the
member’s constituency (Bramlett, Gimpel and Lee, 2011; Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski 2006).
While members of the donor class might all share similar preferences that stem from their
demographic profiles, donors inside the district and/or state of the member likely have different
geographic-based interests than donors outside of the district (Gimpel, Lee and Kaminski, 2006).
As a consequence, out-of-district donor’s preferences are less likely to overlap with constituent
preferences than within-district donors.
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While constituent donors may still hold distinct preferences setting them apart from
average voters in the district, it is possible that members’ reliance upon donors inside the district
may help to counteract the influence of donors outside the district. Constituent donors’
preferences should carry more weight with the member and should be closer to the preferences
of fellow constituents than those of outside donors. However, this relationship has never been
tested. In the models presented below, outside contributions to members are predicted to lead to
distortions in representation whereas contributions to members from within their districts should
strengthen the ties between the member and the district.
Two models of these representational relationships are employed. Both models
examine ideological representation rather than issue-specific or descriptive representation. In
some sense, this choice lowers the bar for uncovering ties between the representative and
constituents because perfect congruence is not anticipated. Rather, the member is evaluated by
the degree to which the member’s liberalism or conservativism reflects the district’s liberalism or
conservativism (see Achen,1977). In simple terms, if member ideology and district ideology are
conceptualized as two circles on a Venn Diagram, one model measures the degree of overlap and
the other measures the areas where the circles do not overlap. The first model of this relationship
is a responsiveness model (see Achen, 1977; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2001; Erickson
and Wright, 2000) that is designed to determine how responsive member’s ideological scores are
to the mean ideological score for their district and whether an increasing reliance upon outside
contributions disrupts that responsiveness and thereby alters the degree to which the two overlap.
The second model is an ideological proximity model (see Achen, 1977; Berstein, 1991)
examining the residual distance between the member’s ideological score and the district
ideological mean. Rather than measuring the degree of overlap in ideology, as is the case in the
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responsiveness model, this model focuses upon the degree to which there is a lack of congruence
between the member and the district. Greater distances are equated with less congruence. More
details about variables and the precise specifications of each model are discussed below.

Data and Method
Campaign contribution data for the 2006, 2008, and 2010 election cycles are obtained
from the U.S. Federal Election Commission’s (FEC) publicly available candidate summary files,
candidate master files, and the itemized files for contributions from individuals to candidate
committees. I use congressional districts and zip codes from the National Annenberg Election
Study (NAES) of 2008—the largest national survey including both variables—to complete these
matches. These variables are utilized separately from individual response data and identifiers
from the survey. I also use the itemized files from the FEC, which contain the zip code
associated with the donor making the contribution to the candidate, coupled with the candidate
master file to match specific contributions to congressional districts to ultimately determine
which contributions originated outside of the member’s district. I focus on 2006, 2008, and 2010
election cycles in the FEC data because I could use the NAES district-zip code file to identify the
origin of individual contributions more reliably in those elections occurring prior to redistricting
after the 2010 Census. Contributions outside of the member’s state were identified first and then
the remaining contributions are identified as originating from within or outside of the member’s
district using the two approaches above. I then aggregate out-of-the-district contributions to each
member of Congress and divide by a thousand. The logic behind this specification is that an
additional dollar may not have a meaningful effect on representation but an additional thousand
dollars might. The amount of money collected from outside of the district rather than the
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percentage of individual receipts collected outside of the district is also hypothesized to
significantly affect representation because members vary in their dependency upon individual
contributions with some being more reliant upon PAC money and others more reliant on
individual receipts. One member may collect fifty-percent of individual contributions from
outside of the district but these funds only amount to fifteen-percent of all receipts whereas for
another member fifty percent of individual receipts coming from outside the district might
constitute fifty percent of all receipts. If the percentages are used, these two members are
indistinguishable. I also account for variations in members’ fundraising sources in other ways
that are discussed below. I follow the same procedure to aggregate contributions originating from
within the district for the second set of models. Non-incumbent candidates are excluded from the
analysis in both instances.
In order to test the impact of respective members’ dependency on outside contributions, I
utilize two different OLS regression models. One model examines legislator responsiveness to
constituents and a second model measures the ideological proximity of the member in relation to
constituent ideological preferences. Members from each party are analyzed separately. In order
to measure constituent ideology, I use responses to the Collaborative Congressional Study’s
question: “Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political
viewpoint?” Respondents selected their answer on an ordinal scale ranging from 1 for very
liberal to 5 for very conservative. I use responses to this question to calculate mean ideology of
each district. The CCES is ideal for this purpose because the average sample size for responses
to the ideology question by congressional district ranged from 171 for 2006 to as high as 213 for
2010—higher than other national surveys. Since CCES was not only conducted in election years
2006, 2008, and 2010, it was possible to compare scores from the 2007 and 2009 surveys to help
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confirm and in some cases supplement the mean ideology score for districts with lower response
rates.
For my measure of members’ ideology, I use members’ NOMINATE scores. For
members in this sample who served in the 110th, 111th, 112th congresses, the NOMINATE scale
ranges from - 0.73 for the most liberal member to 1.23 for the most conservative member. In the
responsiveness model, NOMINATE scores make up the dependent variable and an interaction
term between district ideology and outside contributions in thousands of dollars is utilized to
gauge the extent to which increasing dependence on outside money impacts the influence of
district ideology on the member’s ideological identification. The interpretation of the interaction
term is complicated in this instance because NOMINATE scores range from negative to positive
values. As a consequence, predicted probabilities will be used to interpret the disruptive effect of
outside funds on the member to district ideological ties. In the proximity model, the dependent
variable is the residual distance between the member and district retrieved from a simple
regression of the member’s NOMINATE score on mean district ideology.
In both Republican and Democratic models, I control for a number of factors. Party
pressure may cause a member to be less responsiveness to his or her constituents or to be more
ideologically distant from them (Aldrich and McGinnis, 1989). To reflect this, I control for party
leadership effects using a dummy variable that equals one if the member served as a caucus
leader (e.g. Speaker, conference chair or whip) or as a committee chair and zero otherwise.
Electoral vulnerability can also influence the member’s attentiveness to constituent preferences.
Accordingly, I include a dummy variable using Congressional Quarterly’s October rating of
district competitiveness (Electoral Vulnerability). Similarly, as members achieve greater
influence, electoral safety, and other incumbency advantages associated with seniority they may

9

be less responsive to constituent preferences depending upon the number of years they have
served (Kalt and Zupan, 1990; Chamber Seniority). Since gender differences can have an impact
on the ideology of the member, her responsiveness to constituents (Griffin, Newman, and
Wolbrecht, 2012), and the extent to which the member depends upon on contributions from
outside the district (Crespin and Dietz, 2010), I add a dummy variable that equals one for female
members and zero otherwise (Female). Minority members may also attract more outside
contributions due to descriptive representational functions and they are more likely to be liberal
(Minority). To account for interest group and party influences on the quality of representation
provided by the member, I control for the total amount of reported hard dollars contributions
from PACs and parties to the member’s campaign. These variables are highly correlated. A
summary measure of these receipts reduces multicollinearity but does not change the substantive
meaning of the results (Non-Individual Receipts). Dummy variables are added for election years
with 2006 serving as the reference category.
In addition to these controls, in the responsiveness models, I account for the direct effects
that relying upon individual contributions as the campaign’s primary source of income and
representing a rural district might have on the member’s NOMINATE score. Members who are
highly dependent upon individual contributions might be more ideologically extreme reflecting
the influence of donors who previous studies suggest are also ideologically extreme. As a
consequence, members who receive more than 50 percent of their total receipts from individuals
are coded 1 and 0 otherwise (High Individual Receipts). Members who live in rural districts are
likely to have more conservative NOMINATE scores (see McKee, 2008). To account for this
effect, districts that are 45 percent urban or less according to the 2000 Census are coded 1 and 0,
otherwise (Rural). Finally, due to the fact that many of the same members remained in office
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between 2006 and 2010, both representational models feature clustered standard errors by
candidate identification number.
< Table 1 About Here>
Results
The results of the responsiveness model are displayed in Table 1. The interaction terms in
both the Democratic and Republican models are significant. The results of the member’s
predicted ideology scores in Table 2 help illustrate the interaction between outside money and
district ideology on the member’s NOMINATE score. In this analysis of the regression results, I
examine the predicted probabilities and outcomes generated for the “average” incumbent
candidate in the sample. I did this by calculating these outcomes for particular values of outside
receipts while holding the other independent variables to their observed values for each case in
the sample (see Hanmer and Kalkan, 2009). Confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities
are calculated using the method of statistical simulation (see Hanmer and Kalkan, 2009). In
Table 2, a number of hypothetical congressional districts are also listed. The district ideological
means drawn from the CCES survey are used to identify a hypothetical very liberal, moderate,
and very conservative district for purposes of illustration and comparison. Additionally, different
quintiles of out-of-the-district contributions are shown that reflect the amount of outside support
received by members of each party up to the 90 percentile rather than the maximum as a way of
highlighting the effects for most of the sample rather than for the single member who depended
upon outside contributions the most. Notably, while some Republicans did not collect any
outside receipts, the same could not be said of any Democrats. The lowest outside contribution
total for a Democratic member was $2,500 (see column 1, Table 2). The changes in the predicted
liberalism or conservativism of the member in response to increases in out-of-the-district
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contributions are listed in the last row. Negative values indicate increasing liberalism whereas
positive values represent increasing conservativism (see Table 2).
< Table 2 About Here>
In a very liberal district, the model predicts that a Democratic representative’s
NOMINATE score will shift from a liberal score of -0.557 to an extremely liberal score of 0.948 in response to an increase in out-of-district contributions from $2,500 to $691,000 (see
Table 2). A change from no outside receipts to the 90th percentile cut-point of $613,000 in a
similarly liberal district causes a Republican representative to shift from a fairly moderate
NOMINATE score of 0.272 that better reflects the district’s ideological mean to a much more
conservative NOMINATE score of 0.626. In a hypothetical moderate district, with the specified
increase in outside receipts from the minimum to the 90th percentile, a Democratic member’s
predicted NOMINATE becomes more extreme going from -0.33 to -0.933. In the same district
with a similar increase in outside receipts, a Republican member’s NOMINATE score is
predicted to rise from 0.49, which is already quite conservative, to an extreme of 1.02. In a
hypothetical district with a mean ideology score that is very conservative, a Democratic member
is predicted to be quite moderate. With only $2,500 in outside funding the Democrats
NOMINATE score is predicted to be -0.097. However, an increasing dependency on outside
funds shifts their score to a much more liberal -0.919. In the same district, a Republican
member’s predicted NOMINATE score rises from 0.712 to a much more conservative 1.42 with
$613,000 in outside funding. While liberal Democrats are unlikely to gain seats in very
conservative districts and conservative Republicans are unlikely to hold seats in very liberal
districts, this analysis demonstrates that members responsiveness to district ideological
preferences declines with an increasing dependency on contributions from outside the district.
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Additionally, members of both parties also predicted to become ideologically extreme as a
consequence of this dependency.
< Table 3 About Here>
The results of the proximity model, which utilizes the residuals generated from the
member’s NOMINATE score regressed on the district’s mean ideology score, can be found in
Table 3. In the both the Democratic and Republican models, contributions originating from
within the district significantly reduce the residual distance between the member and the
district’s ideological scores. Monte Carlo simulations are used again to estimate the impact of
within-district contributions on the representative relationship between an average Democratic or
Republican House member and an average House district (see Table 4). As noted previously,
there are differences between party members’ reliance upon funds from individuals. Since some
incumbents rely upon other sources of money, there exist just a handful of members of both
parties who did not collect any contributions from individuals within their districts—such a
choice is quite atypical. Nonetheless these minimums are utilized to gauge the magnitude of the
effect of with-in district funds. Going from this minimum of zero within-district funds to the 90
percentile of $288,000, reduces the distance between Democratic members and their districts by
0.06 (see Table 4). Similarly, with an increase from no within-district funds to $386,000, the
distance between an average Republican member and the district shrinks by 0.05 (see Table 4).
Since the possible residual values generated from the dataset range from -1.13 to 0.875, a
decrease in residual distance of 0.05 or 0.06 represents a reduction in the possible gap of just
2.5% or 3% respectively. As a consequence, while statistically within-district contributions
significantly reduce the distance between the member and the district, the magnitude of that
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effect is substantively quite small indicating any corrective effect associated with members’
reliance upon within-district funds is minimal.
< Table 4 About Here>

Responsiveness and Proximity in Representational Relationships
Without exception, contributions from individual donors residing outside of the district
disrupt the ideological ties between House members and their constituents. Moreover, an average
member of the House will become less responsive to district ideological preferences for a very
small price. Members of both parties are predicted to shift their NOMINATE scores an average
of 0.07 with the receipt of only the 25th percentile in outside contributions—amounting to
$90,233 for Democrats and $83,800 for Republicans in outside receipts (see Table 2). This
decline in responsiveness is substantial when the fundraising profiles of the average Democrat or
Republican member are considered. The average member of both parties raised a total of $1.3
million from all sources of campaign funds. Out of these average totals, Democratic members
raised an average of $683,000 and Republican members raised an average of $721,000 from
individual donors. This means an average member of the House will start to become less
responsive to district preferences when outside contributions constitute only 6% or 7% of all
campaign receipts and 12% to 13% of contributions from individual donors. When outside
contributions more than 50 percent of an average member’s individual contributions, their
NOMINATE score responds by shifting an average of 0.33 in a more extremely liberal or
conservative direction. In doing so, members do not simply become less responsive to their
particular districts. As their dependency upon outside funds grows, they also become
ideologically polarized.
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By 2006 polarization in the House had already risen to unprecedented levels compared to
those in the twentieth century (Theriault, 2008) and party polarization increased further between
2006 and 2010 (Carmines, 2011)—the years covered by this analysis. Despite the polarized
context in which these representational relationships are analyzed, Democrats and Republicans
who are the least reliant upon outside funding (if at all) are predicted to be more moderate than
their parties’ ideological medians if they represent moderate districts. In the unlikely
circumstance that they win seats in districts that are more supportive of the opposition party—an
outcome that is more likely for Democrats who continue to represent a wider array of districts
featuring different ideologies than Republicans—those who are minimally dependent upon
outside funding sources are also more likely to be moderates. To put this in perspective, the
Democratic caucus’ median NOMINATE score in the House varied between -0.367 in 2006 and
-0.398 in 2010 and the Republican caucus’ median NOMINATE score ranged between 0.618 in
2006 and 0.674 in 2010. A glance at Table 2 shows Democrats and Republicans who represent
moderate districts and who have a limited dependency on outside funds, have predicted
NOMINATE scores of -0.33 and 0.49 respectively and scores of -0.10 and 0.27 in districts
supportive of the opposition party. However, a growing dependence on outside funds quickly
causes their NOMINATE scores to shift well above both parties’ medians. At the 90th percentile
predicted scores are as high as -1 and 1.4 indicating that the members who receive the most
outside money are likely to be the most polarized in the House. Moderate districts are the
greatest losers as this dependency on outside contributions grows because moderate districts are
predicted to end up with members who are completely unresponsive to and unreflective of their
ideological preferences.
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Fifty-five percent of members in the 110th and 112th congresses and 52 percent of
members in the 111th Congress received more than 65 percent of their individual contributions
from outside of their districts. While there is not enough variation in this sample to suggest that
members’ reliance upon outside funds constitutes a major cause of congressional polarization,
the evidence does suggest that individual members are incentivized to adopt the more
ideologically extreme preferences of the donor class (Francia et. al., 2003; Francia et. al., 2005)
as their dependency on those financial resources grows. Otherwise, the amount of money from
individuals outside of the district should not diminish the sensitivity of the member’s
NOMINATE score to the district’s ideological mean. Although perfect congruence between the
member’s ideological score and the district’s ideological mean is extremely unlikely, ideally
these funds would have no effect or a much smaller impact on member’s scores—for example,
shifting them slightly closer to their party caucus’ ideological medians rather than to ideological
extremes. However, sharp declines in members’ responsiveness with minimal amounts of outside
funds coupled with ideologically polarized positioning by dependent members suggest nonconstituent donors have more influence than constituents over House members’ behavior and
non-constituent donors are more ideologically extreme than voters.
Further, the results suggest within-district contributions only minimally reduce the lack of
ideological congruence between the member and district. They certainly do not do so enough to
counteract the influence of outside contributions. As previous research suggests, the lack of a
corrective effect might be a consequence of the fact that the ideological preferences of donors
within the district and donors outside of the district are not very distinct from one another
(Gimpel, Lee, and Kaminski, 2006; Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2008; Page, Bartels,
and Seawright, 2013). Although ideological data for all of the donors who contributed to the
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House members in this sample are not available, the CCES of 2008 and 2012 include questions
asking respondents if they contributed to the House candidates running in their own district or to
candidates running in other districts. Responses to these questions make it possible to compare
the ideologies of self-identified within-district and out-of-district donors with those of selfreported voters on the five-point ideology scale used in the models to calculate mean district
ideology. The scale ranges from 1 for very liberal to 5 for very conservative. The average district
in the sample features an ideology score of 3.2. Democratic voters’ average ideology score
stands at 2.3 and for Republican voters it is 4.2. Self-identified within-district Democratic donors
have an average score of 1.9 and for within-district Republican donors the average score is 4.4.
Democratic out-of-district donors exhibit an average score of 1.8, a slightly more liberal score
than within-district donors and a much more liberal average score than self-identified
Democratic voters. Republican out-of-district donors average ideology is 4.4, the same as
Republican within-district donors, and much closer to Republican voters’ average score of 4.2
than the same pair of scores for Democrats. As a consequence of the similarities in the
ideological means of within-district and outside donors, the prospect of within-district
contributions reigning in members seems unlikely and makes the small reduction in the residual
distance between the member and the district that was uncovered more surprising.
Ideological responsiveness and the degree of ideological proximity between the member
and the district hardly encompass every facet of the representational relationship but these
models of ideological congruence on the one hand and ideological divergence on the other
provide a minimal standard of what that relationship should look like between House members
and their constituencies. The expectation is that members and districts will ideologically overlap
to some extent and other influences will not undermine a basic degree of alignment (Achen,
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1977). Unfortunately, the results suggest donors can incentivize members to adopt more
ideologically extreme positions that are in keeping with donors’ ideological preferences. In doing
so, the donor class successfully gains surrogate representation (see Mansbridge, 2003) while
leaving constituents short-changed when it comes to the quality of representation they are likely
to receive from their members of Congress.
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Table 1: Responsiveness Models 2006-2010 Pooled
DV = DW-NOMINATE
Democrats
Republicans
District Ideology
0.231*** (0.023)
0.221***(0.058)
Outside Contributions (Thousands $)
0.0001* (0.00002)
0.000005 (0.00002)
District Ideology X Outside Contributions -0.0003* (0.0001)
0.0003* (0.0001)
Non-Individual Receipts (Thousands $)
0.0001***(0.00002) -0.00003 (0.00003)
Female Member
-0.013 (0.014)
-0.006 (0.026)
Electorally Vulnerable
0.022 (0.015)
-0.057*(0.022)
Party Leader
-0.033 (0.024)
0.010 (0.024)
Chamber Seniority
-0.007***(0.001)
-0.002 (0.003)
Rural
0.028 (0.025)
-0.115**(0.033)
High Individual Contributions > 50%
-0.025* (0.013)
0.025 (0.017)
Minority Member
-0.032* (0.014)
-0.046 (0.042)
Constant
-0.991***(0.070)
-0.161 (0.199)
R-Squared
0.567
0.177
Observations
674
588
NOTE: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; Errors
clustered by candidate ID; Dummies for 2008 and 2010 not shown.
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Table 2: Predicted NOMINATE Scores by District Ideology
DEMOCRATS
Percentile
$ (Thousands) 2=Very Liberal
Minimum
2.5 -0.557 (-0.59, -0.52)
25th
90.2 -0.607 (-0.64, -0.57)
Median
198 -0.668 (-0.72, -0.62)
75th
419.9 -0.794 (-0.89, -0.69)
90th
691 -0.948 (-1.12, -0.77)
Change (Max-Min)
-0.391
REPUBLICANS
Percentile
$ (Thousands) 2=Very Liberal
Minimum
0 0.272 (0.17, 0.38)
25th
83.8 0.321 (0.21, 0.43)
Median
186.3 0.380 (0.26, 0.49)
75th
353.7 0.476 (0.32, 0.62)
90th
613 0.626 (0.39, 0. 85)
Change (Max-Min)
0.354
Note: Confidence intervals in parentheses.
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3= Moderate
-0.330 (-0.36, -0.30)
-0.404 (-0.42, -0.39)
-0.499 (-0.55, -0.44)
-0.694 (-0.84, -0.55)
-0.933 (-1.20, -0.67)
-0.603

4= Very Conservative
-0.097 (-0.14, -0.05)
-0.201 (-0.24, -0.17)
-0.330 (-0.41, -0.25)
-0.595 (-0.80, -0.40)
-0.919 (-1.28, -0.57)
-0.822

3= Moderate
0.492 (0.45, 0.54)
0.564 (0.53, 0.60)
0.653 (0.57, 0.73)
0.797 (0.62, 0.96)
1.021 (0.70, 1.31)
0.529

4= Very Conservative
0.712 (0.65, 0.78)
0.808 (0.75, 0.86)
0.926 (0.81, 1.04)
1.118 (0.87, 1.35)
1.416 (0.97, 1.85)
0.704

Table 3: Residual Distance Model
DV = Residuals
Democrats
Republicans
Within District Contributions (Thousands $) -0.0002* (0.0001)
-0.0001** (0.00005)
Chamber Seniority
-0.016*** (0.004)
-0.008** (0.003)
Vulnerable to Electoral Defeat
0.086* (0.040)
-0.099*** (0.023)
Party Leadership Position
-0.054 (0.074)
0.035 (0.036)
Female Member
-0.210*** (0.045)
-0.013 (0.037)
Minority Member
-0.089* (0.043)
-0.196* (0.076)
Non-Individual Receipts (Thousands $)
0.0002*** (0.00005)
-0.00004 (0.00002)
Constant
0.003 (0.046)
-0.332*** (0.022)
R-Squared
0.278
0.182
Observations
676
590
Note: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 ***p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses. Errors clustered by
candidate ID; Dummies for 2008 and 2010 not shown.
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Table 4: Predicted Residual Distance by Amount of WithinDistrict Individual Contributions (Thousands $)
Republicans
$
Minimum
0 0.293 (0.27, 0.31)
25th
50.4 0.287 (0.27, 0.30)
Median
128.6 0.276 (0.26, 0.29)
75th
258.3 0.259 (0.24, 0.28)
90th
386 0.242 (0.22, 0.26)
Change (Max-Min)
-0.051
Democrats
$
Minimum
0 -0.026 (-0.05, 0.005)
25th
23.2 -0.031 (-0.06, -0.002)
Median
65 -0.039 (-0.06, -0.01)
75th
165.3 -0.060 (-0.08, -0.04)
90th
288 -0.085 (-0.12, -0.05)
Change (Max-Min)
-0.059
Note: Confidence intervals in parentheses.
Contributions are in thousands of dollars.
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